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Abstract: This paper examines the impact of deposit insurance (DI) schemes on bilateral cross-
border deposits. Our results suggest that not only the existence of explicit DI, but also DI design 
features, which reflect its credibility, have an impact on cross-border deposits. Relative differences 
between reporting and depositor countries also matter. In times of crises, depositors rely more on DI 
in general, but DI acts primarily as a “Safe Haven” rather than enabling “Regulatory Arbitrage”. 
During the global financial crisis of 2008/09 the emergency actions of bank country governments, 
which supply and maintain these safe havens, have led to substantial relocations of cross-border 
deposits. These results suggest that un-coordinated policy actions matter in times of crises and 
harmonization of DI schemes could have stabilizing effects on the allocation of cross-border deposits.  
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1. Introduction 
Until the 2008/09 financial crisis, cross-border depositing increased rapidly not only in the interbank 
market, but also in the retail market. After a short period of retrenchment during the crisis, cross-
border depositing started growing again and by September 2014 rose to US$26 trillion, of which 
US$8 trillion constitute cross-border liabilities to non-banks. 1  Global deregulation, regional 
integration initiatives such as the introduction of the euro and the elimination of capital controls in 
many developing countries enabled banks to rapidly expand cross-border financial services. For 
customers, foreign deposit markets offer not only return opportunities and product diversity but 
foreign deposit insurance (DI) schemes also provide cross-border depositors with an opportunity for 
regulatory arbitrage and access to a safe haven, especially during financial crises. However, large-
scale re-allocations of cross-border deposits could also contribute to an intensification of financial 
crises. This paper provides an in-depth investigation of the relationship between cross-border retail 
depositing and national DI schemes in tranquil and crisis times. By evaluating the impact of the 
emergency actions taken during the 2008/09 global financial crisis, we also provide a unique analysis 
of the impact of crisis policies on cross-border banking.   
 The existence of a DI can make a banking market more attractive to cross-border depositors 
in two ways: First, depositor’s funds are guaranteed by the DI agency. Second, a DI scheme may 
contribute to a more stable banking system by preventing bank runs as argued by Diamond & Dybvig 
(1983). However, this effect is disputed as moral hazard can induce banks to engage in riskier 
activities thereby increasing the likelihood of a banking crisis (Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 1997, 
2002; Rossi, 1999). Furthermore, DI schemes may simply provide favored banks with hidden 
subsidies rather than to reduce systematic risk  unless certain design features put limits on moral 
hazard and adverse selection behavior (Calomiris & Jaremski, 2016). The empirical literature does 
not yet offer any unambiguous evidence on the relevance of DI for cross-border depositing. For 
example, Lane & Sarisoy (2000) examine the relationship between an explicit DI and several 
measures of private capital inflows to developing countries but find no significant link. However, 
their measures of capital inflows are mainly composed of funds that are not insured.2 Huizinga & 
Nicodème (2006) focus more closely on international liabilities including deposits.3 While they find 
that non-bank external liabilities increase after introduction of an explicit DI, they do not find any 
                                                          
1
 As reported by the Bank of International Settlements’ Locational Banking Statistics. 
2
 Lane & Sarisoy (2000) focus on developing countries in 1990s and analyze gross private capital flows, net 
private capital flows, international syndicated loans and international bond issues. 
3
 Huizinga & Nicodème (2006) focus on developed countries from 1983 to 1999 and analyze the impact of the 
existence of an explicit DI scheme on external liabilities. Their data differentiate interbank and non-bank 
liabilities and originate from the BIS’s International Banking Statistics. Note however that (1) interbank 
liabilities are generally not insured and (2) non-bank liabilities include insured deposits but also a certain 
amount of uninsured funds. 
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role for specific DI features. Similar to Lane & Sarisoy (2000), their results are at least in part driven 
by the inclusion of uninsured liabilities.  Furthermore, due to the aggregate level of their data at the 
bank country level, they are only able to investigate whether a DI system makes a given country 
more attractive to all foreign depositors in general.  
By contrast, our paper employs a uniquely suitable data set of bilateral cross-border retail 
deposits provided confidentially by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). Our data are based 
on the BIS’s Locational Banking Statistics and cover cross-border deposits between 131 depositor 
countries and 22 bank countries for the period from 1998 to 2011. We are – to the best of our 
knowledge – the first to use such a detailed dataset and are therefore able to contribute to the 
understanding of the role of DI schemes for cross-border depositing in numerous ways. First, our 
study extends the literature by analyzing retail deposits, e.g. deposits of households and non-
financial corporations that are actually covered by DI schemes. As such, we can investigate the direct 
insurance effects and do not need to make any interference about the implications of DI systems on 
financial systems. Second, we investigate not only the attractiveness of the bank countries’ DI, but 
also the importance of DI differences between the depositor’s home country and the bank country. 
Analyzing the role of bank countries’ regulations builds on the existing literature and inquires 
whether DI provides a “Safe Haven”. The analysis of DI differences across countries adds to the 
literature and is informative about “Regulatory Arbitrage”. Third, we investigate not only the effect 
of an explicit DI but also consider its specific features. As argued by Eisenbeis & Kaufman (2015) the 
effectiveness of a DI depends crucially on its design and implementation.4 Despite deposit market 
internationalization, significant heterogeneity still exists across national DI schemes5 potentially 
increasing the relative attractiveness of a deposit market. As our analyses will cover regulatory 
differences across countries we can provide in-depth insights into which features of a DI can induce 
regulatory arbitrage.6 Fourth, we provide an analysis of the potentially changing importance of safe 
havens and regulatory arbitrage during stable versus crisis times using the Laeven & Valencia (2008, 
2010, 2012) financial crisis database. Here we build on Kleimeier, Sander, & Heuchemer (2013) who 
find that during systemic banking crises, depositors discipline their home banking system by re-
locating deposits to foreign safe havens.7 Fifth and finally, we investigate the impact and efficiency 
                                                          
4
 For a similar argument, albeit from a more sceptical view regarding deposit insurance schemes, see Calomiris 
& Jaremski (2016). 
5
 See Dale, Bruni, & De Boissieu (2000), Eisenbeis & Kaufman (2006, 2008).  
6
 We thereby contribute indirectly to the literature on DI design including optimal DI schemes and implications 
on the banking systems and financial markets. See Garcia (1999), Demirgüç-Kunt & Sobaci (2001), Demirgüç-
Kunt & Detragiache (2002), Demirgüç-Kunt, Karacaovali, & Laeven (2005), Hoelscher, Taylor, & Klueh (2006), 
Laeven & Beck (2006), Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, & Laeven (2014). 
7
 Kleimeier, Sander, & Heuchemer (2013) build on the literature on the disciplining role of (domestic) 
depositors pioneered by Berger (1991). Later contributions e.g. report evidence for a “flight to quality (safety) 
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of emergency actions taken by many countries in response to the severity of the 2008/09 crisis, 
which included explicit and often enhanced government guarantees over and above the regular DI 
coverage. We find that both, the quest for safe haven and regulatory arbitrage are important drivers 
of cross-border depositing in stable times. Conversely, in times of financial crisis, it is mainly the safe 
haven motive that dominates. This safe haven motive is particularly important during the financial 
crisis of 2008/09. We also provide evidence that the emergency actions taken in bank countries, in 
particular the introduction of government guarantees, are major drivers of global retail deposit 
relocations towards safe havens. 
 The plan of the paper is as follow. In section 2 we develop our gravity model for analyzing 
the impact of DI on cross-border deposits by formulating five hypotheses and the corresponding 
specifications of the gravity model. Section 3 details the various extensive databases we are using. 
Section 4 reports the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. A Gravity Model of Cross-Border Deposits 
We apply a gravity model framework to empirically analyze the impact of DI on bilateral cross-
border deposits. Based on Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963), the gravity model has been 
proven successful in explaining international trade and, in its basic form, explains bilateral trade with 
the trading partners’ economic masses and geographical distance (Krugman, 1980; Helpman & 
Krugman, 1985; Baltagi, Egger, & Pfaffermayr, 2003). Later studies extend this basic model to 
capture additional bilateral characteristics more precisely, including joint trade agreements, 
common currency membership, or cultural distance (Baxter & Kouparitsas, 2006). In line with Portes 
& Rey (2005), who argue that gravity models could at least work as well in explaining asset trades as 
good trades, gravity modelling has more recently extended to the realm of international finance as 
well (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2008; Martin & Rey, 2004; Buch, 2005; Portes & Rey, 2005; Aviat & 
Coeurdacier, 2007; Buch & Lipponer, 2007; Coeurdacier & Martin, 2009; Heuchemer, Kleimeier, & 
Sander, 2009; Okawa & Van Wincoop, 2012; Kleimeier, Sander, & Heuchemer, 2013; Sander, 
Kleimeier, & Heuchemer, 2013, 2016). The bilateral character of the dependent variable makes the 
gravity approach the model of choice to analyze both, the safe haven behavior and, in particular, 
regulatory arbitrage behavior.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
by depositors” during the Asian crisis of 1997/08 (Ding, Domac, & Ferri, 1998). Rochet (2004) reports empirical 
evidence for direct market discipline in crisis periods when depositors are able to “vote with their feet”. Park & 
Peristiani (1998) and Martinez Peria & Schmukler (2001) find similar effects during the banking crises in USA in 
the 1980s, and Argentina, Chile, Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. 
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We start with the investigation of safe haven behavior and employ the following gravity 
model that tests the relationship between DI schemes in the bank countries and cross-border 
deposits: 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                           (1) 
 
where 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 are the exchange rate adjusted stocks of cross-border deposits from depositors in 
country j to banks in country i in year t. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 refers to the economic masses of bank country i and 
depositor country j in year t, which equals to the sum of logarithmic GDP of the two countries. 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡  
represents other control variables commonly used in gravity models, including proxies for banking 
market size, de facto and de jure openness (e.g. bilateral trade and a globalization index), currency 
unions and free trade agreements. Following Baldwin & Taglioni (2006) and in accordance with 
Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, & Siegel (2013) we use a full set of country pair, bank country, depositor 
country and year fixed effects given by  𝛼𝑖𝑗  , 𝛼𝑖 , 𝛼𝑗 and 𝛼𝑡, respectively. Our focus does not lie on 
the general determinants of international deposits. Thus, instead of adding controls for transactional 
frictions such as geographical and culture distance, legal origin and common language8, we employ 
country pair fixed effects to control for all these time-invariant variables that may affect cross-
border deposits.  Country pair fixed effects can control bilateral trade resistance which is the size of 
the barriers to trade between countries i and j. In addition, we follow James & Van Wincoop (2003) 
and include bank and depositor country fixed effects to control multilateral trade resistance, which 
refers to the barriers which each country i and j faces in their trade with all their trading partners 
(including domestic and internal trade). Finally, we employ year fixed effects to control for common 
time-varying factors. 𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 is our variable of interest and captures the different features of the bank 
country’s DI scheme. In its simplest form, it represents a dummy variable equal to 1 when an explicit 
DI exists in the bank country i in year t but we also explicitly measure various design features of the 
DI scheme in the bank countries.  
We postulate that depositors are attracted to a given bank country when its DI provides 
depositors with a safe haven. As banks transform deposits into risky loans and other risky assets, 
depositors are exposed to the bank’s credit risk. However, depositors prefer to reduce or even 
eliminate their exposure to bank risk and thus value the protection provided by DI. However, 
                                                          
8
 Regarding specific determinants of cross-border deposits, Grilli (1989) finds that non-bank deposits are 
driven by interest taxes and bank secrecy, while interbank deposits are determined by dividend taxes and 
economic size. Alworth & Andresen (1992) use a gravity model to explain cross-border deposits with reserve 
ratios. Huizinga & Nicodème (2004) find a weak linkage between bilateral bank liabilities held by non-banks 
and income taxes. Sander, Kleimeier, & Heuchemer (2016) find that cultural differences act as barriers to 
cross-border depositing in the Eurozone. 
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only a well-designed DI scheme can provide depositors with effective risk reduction and avoid 
moral hazard problems (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983, 1986; Merton & Thakor, 2015). As such, 
specific features of the DI scheme such as coverage limit or intensity, repayment history, moral 
hazard mitigation or power of the DI agency should matter to depositors. These considerations 
lead to our first hypothesis:  
 
H1: Safe Haven Hypothesis  
Compared to bank countries without an explicit DI, the existence of an explicit DI makes a bank 
country more attractive for cross-border depositors. In addition, the attractiveness of a bank country 
for cross-border depositors increases with the strength of its DI scheme relative to the strength of 
other bank countries’ DI schemes. 
 
As countries also have their own freedom to design their DI schemes, this provides room for 
international regulatory competition and thus for regulatory arbitrage by depositors. Specifically, the 
differences in DI schemes between bank and depositor countries may matter in a relative way, with 
the DI system in the depositor country serving as a benchmark. Thus, besides the absolute quality of 
a DI system in the bank country, depositors may also care about the relative quality of a DI system in 
the bank country, taking into account other variables such as physical and cultural proximity or the 
existence of joint trade agreements or a joint currency. This leads to our second hypothesis. 
 
H2: Regulatory Arbitrage Hypothesis  
The existence of an explicit DI makes a bank country attractive for cross-border depositors from 
countries that lack an explicit DI. In addition, the attractiveness of a bank country for cross-border 
depositors increases with the strength of bank country’s DI scheme relative to the strength of 
depositor country’s DI scheme. 
 
In order to test the Regulatory Arbitrage Hypothesis, we adjust model (1) to allow for the differences 
in DI schemes across bank and depositor countries, as shown by  𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 below.  
 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                          (2) 
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But do the effects postulated in the Safe Haven and Regulatory Arbitrage Hypotheses hold 
when the depositor experiences a banking crisis at home9, and if so, which effects are more 
pronounced? For instance, depositors from countries that are undergoing a systemic banking crisis 
may search for a better DI abroad either in the relative sense of regulatory arbitrage or in the 
absolute sense of a safe haven. However, it may also be possible that depositors totally lose faith in 
the banking sector and its DI and as a result the relationships between DI and cross-border 
depositing diminishes or even disappears. Thus we formulate two hypotheses with respect to 
financial crisis in depositor countries: 
 
H3: Safe Haven in Crisis Hypothesis 
 The importance attributed by cross-border depositors to the existence and strength of the bank 
country’s DI increases when depositors experience a banking crisis at home.  
 
H4: Regulatory Arbitrage in Crisis Hypothesis 
The importance attributed by cross-border depositors to the existence and strength of the bank 
country’s DI relative to the depositor country’s DI increases when depositors experience a banking 
crisis at home.  
 
To test these hypotheses, we estimate the following two regressions, with model (3) focusing on the 
bank country features and thus testing the Crisis Hypothesis in the context of our save haven 
argument and model (4) focusing on the differences across countries and thus testing the Crisis 
Hypotheses in the context of regulatory arbitrage: 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡      (3) 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡    (4) 
 
where 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑗𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to 1 when there is no systemic banking crisis in depositor 
country j in year t. Similarly, 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to 1 when there is a systemic banking 
crisis in depositor country j in year t. An insignificant 𝛽2 implies that DI does not matter for cross-
                                                          
9
 We would also like to investigate what happens when a bank country experiences a crisis. As described in the 
next section, our sample period covers 1998 to 2011 and covers 22 bank countries and 131 depositor countries. 
However, we observe systemic banking crises only in depositor countries with a single exception: The 2008/09 
crisis also affected bank countries. Due to its unique features, i.e. the fact the countries adjusted their DI 
schemes in response to the crisis, we will study the 2008/09 crisis separately in the context of our Emergency 
Actions Hypothesis. 
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border depositors during a crisis. Similarly, if 𝛽2 is significantly smaller than 𝛽1or has the opposite 
sign, a banking crisis destroys the faith in DI systems and thus diminishes or even eliminates the 
relationships. However, a 𝛽2 that is significantly larger in absolute values and has the same sign as 𝛽1 
suggests that depositors trust foreign DI schemes during crises, which supports either the Safe 
Haven in Crisis Hypothesis or Regulatory Arbitrage in Crisis Hypothesis or both.  
The two crisis hypotheses as outlined above are applicable to the majority of historic 
banking crises as these are country specific. The 2008/09 banking crisis which started in the US is 
however different as it spilled over into numerous countries and became an almost global crisis. In 
response to the severity of the crisis, many countries revised their DI schemes. According to 
International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI), at least 49 countries enhanced depositor 
protection, including 20 countries with maximum coverage increases (e.g. full guarantees), 22 
countries with permanent coverage increases and seven countries with temporary coverage 
increases. These actions were initiated in Europe but quickly spread to nearly every continent, e.g. 
most revisions took effect between September 2008 and March 2009. These emergency actions to 
enhance DI systems provide us with a great opportunity to more specifically examine how the 
changing design features of DI impact cross-border deposits. Before the 2008/09 crisis, the main goal 
of DI agencies was protecting small depositors, as they did not have the ability to understand and 
monitor the risks taken by financial institutions. However, after the crisis, maintaining and 
strengthening the stability of the financial system has been set as the primary goal delegating the 
protection of small depositors to secondary importance (Bernet & Walter, 2009). Thus our fifth and 
final hypothesis postulates the following: 
 
H5: Emergency Actions Hypothesis  
The emergency actions taken by the bank country regarding its explicit DI ensure that the bank 
country remains an attractive safe haven for cross-border depositors. 
 
To empirically test this hypothesis, we will employ a difference in difference analysis within our 
gravity model setting: 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 2008/09 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑)𝑖𝑡+𝛽2𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                      (5) 
 
where emergency action is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank country adopted various 
emergency actions to enhance its DI, and 0 otherwise. These emergency actions include an explicit 
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DI Introduction or the provision of an official government guarantee, limited government guarantee 
or unlimited government guarantee. 2008/09 crisis period is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the 
period from 2008 to 2011 when emergency actions are taken. Our model already includes bank 
country fixed effects and year fixed effects, thus the separate effects of these two variables are 
already included. 𝛽1  represents the treatment effect, which measures the impact of these 
emergency actions on cross-border deposits. 
 
3. Data 
Our paper is -to the best of our knowledge- unique in that it utilizes all major recent databases on 
global DI in a systematic manner and investigate their effects on cross-border retail depositing using 
a unique, custom made, confidential, and bilateral country-level data set provided by BIS. Using 
bilateral data allows us to examine cross-border depositing for all pairs of bank and depositor 
countries.10 Furthermore, we only consider non-bank deposits, which are mainly held by individuals 
and businesses as DI schemes tend to only cover non-bank deposits but exclude interbank deposits 
from coverage. The BIS Locational Banking Statistics are perfectly suited to analyze such cross-
border banking activities as they are compiled using principles that are consistent with balance of 
payments and thus the principle of residence. However, the publicly available data can only be 
disaggregated either by bank country or by depositor country, instead of being disaggregated 
bilaterally by both at the same time. Therefore, our paper uses a customized and confidential data 
set made available by BIS, which exactly provides this bilateral disaggregation. Although the BIS 
Consolidated Banking Statistics publicly provide bilateral data, these data only report foreign claims 
and not deposits. Furthermore, the consolidated data are based on the principle of nationality 
instead of residence. In conclusion, the BIS Locational Banking Statistics are preferable. 
Our sample covers 22 bank countries11 and 131 depositor countries from 1998 to 2011 but 
not all bilateral cross-border deposits Xijt are available for all years. As such our panel is unbalanced. 
When testing the Safe Haven, Regulatory Arbitrage and Crisis Hypotheses, we only consider a sample 
period from 1998 to 2007. When testing the Emergency Actions Hypothesis, we rely on a sample 
                                                          
10
 A cross-border deposit occurs when a bank in one country receives a deposit from a depositor who resides 
in another country. Specifically, our definition is based on the residence and not the nationality of the bank 
and depositor. For instance, a cross-border deposit is made when a depositor who resides in country A 
deposits money at an institution (i.e. subsidiary or branch) of a bank that is located in country B, independent 
of where the head-quarter of the bank is located. In comparison, domestic deposits are made when residents 
of country B deposit money with a bank that is located in country B. Thus, we are exactly examining those 
cases where a depositor crosses a national border. 
11
 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Macao SAR, Netherlands, Panama, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
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period of 1998 to 2011.12 The BIS reports unadjusted stocks and exchange rate adjusted flows of 
cross-border deposits. In order to eliminate any potential exchange rate valuation effects, we 
calculate annual exchange rate adjusted stocks by taking the initial nominal stocks and successively 
adding the exchange rate adjusted flows. Figure 1 provides a first impression of the evolvement of 
cross-border deposits over time. Both unadjusted and adjusted stocks show high growth from 
US$ 1.3 trillion in 1998 to around US$ 5 trillion in 2008 before dropping by as much as 25% as a 
consequence of the 2008/09 banking crisis. Importantly, about 16% of the deposit stock volume in 
2008 can be attributed to exchange rate valuation effects. Therefore, it is necessary and important 
to adjust for exchange rate valuation effects. Furthermore, our sample is quite heterogeneous as it 
covers a wide range of countries with different levels of economic and financial development. Figure 
2 plots the total annual volume of cross-border deposits that a given bank country receives from all 
depositor countries, averaged across years. Figure 2 reveals how substantial the differences across 
countries are. In the average year, Chile receives the least cross-border deposits, amounting to only 
US$ 307 million from all depositor countries combined. In contrast, banks in the United Kingdom 
receive the most cross-border deposits amounting to US$ 607 billion. 
 
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
 
The main DI data source that we rely on to test our safe haven and regulatory arbitrage 
hypotheses is ‘Chapter 8: Depositor (Savings) Protection Schemes’ in the World Bank’s Bank 
Regulation and Supervision Database due to its indicator consistency and high survey frequency (see 
also Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 2001; Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, Martinez Peria, & Mohseni-Cheraghlou, 
2012). Regarding indicator consistency, we are able to not only measure Djt and Dijt as the existence 
of an explicit DI but are also able to obtain proxies for specific DI characteristics. Regarding the 
survey frequency, we fill the gap between two consecutive surveys. Specifically, 1998-2001 is filled 
with data in the survey that was started in 1998. Similarly, 2002-2005 and 2006-2007 are filled with 
data from the surveys that were conducted in 2002 and 2006 respectively. We only expand the 
survey data forward so that cross-border deposits are regressed on pre-determined designs of DI 
systems.  
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 Our full data set for cross-border deposit covers 1995-2011, however, the DI data set only start from 1998, 
and during the 2008/09 financial crisis, many emergency actions have been taken to enhance the DI schemes, 
both permanently and temporarily. Thus we end our first sample in 2007, and analyze the impact of these 
emergency actions in 2008 in the following section. Another reason to end our first sample period in 2007 is 
that before the 2008/09 financial crises, systemic banking crises only occurred in depositor countries, not in 
bank countries, in our BIS sample. Thus leaving out the post-2007 period enables us to separate the “old” 
crises from the “new”, which is more complicated and also occurred in the bank countries in our sample. 
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Our proxies for specific DI characteristics capture the insurance benefits for the depositor as 
well as the moral hazard problem introduced by a poorly designed DI scheme. As argued by Barth, 
Caprio, & Levine (2004), the existence of a DI can induce banks to increase their risk taking and a 
moral hazard problem arises when risk levels become excessive. However, a DI scheme can be 
designed to limit moral hazard for example by introducing bank funding or risk-based insurance fees.  
We consider the existence of an explicit DI, the DI power, DI moral hazard mitigation, DI repayment 
history, DI coverage intensity and DI coverage limit as core features of a DI scheme and will thus 
focus on them in our empirical analyses.13  
Among these six DI proxies, the existence of an explicit DI is our most fundamental measure. 
It is defined as a dummy variable equal to one if a bank country has an explicit DI in place and zero if 
no or only an implicit DI exists in the bank country.  
As our second proxy, we include Barth, Caprio, & Levine (2004) DI power measure. This index 
considers whether the DI agency has the power to make the decision to intervene in a bank, to 
revoke its DI coverage, has the power to take legal action against bank directors or officials, or has 
ever taken any legal action against bank directors or officers. The index ranges from zero to four, 
depending on whether the DI agency has none or all four of these powers. A DI agency without these 
powers might be ineffective, i.e. in cases of political interference or weak relationships between DI 
agency and the bank supervisors, who instead of the DI agency have the power to resolve bank 
failures (Garcia, 1999).  
Third, we combine some of the individual DI features to generate a DI moral hazard 
mitigation index. Here we follow Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache (2002) and consider whether a DI 
scheme is funded by the banks themselves rather than the government and whether the insurance 
fees charged to banks vary based on risk assessment. In each case, a value of one is assigned such 
that the DI moral hazard mitigation index can range from 0 to 2. Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache (2002) 
argue that moral hazard is stronger under government funding but weaker under bank funding as 
banks do not bear the cost of their moral hazard. Thus, higher values for the DI moral hazard 
mitigation index imply greater ability to mitigate moral hazard. 
Our remaining DI proxies measure to what extent depositors are covered by the DI scheme. 
On the one hand, Garcia (1999) argues that limited or restricted DI coverage reduces moral hazard 
as large, sophisticated depositors remain uninsured and thus have an incentive to monitor and 
discipline banks by demanding higher deposit rates or refusing to deposit funds altogether. On the 
other hand, depositors might be more attracted to a banking market where DI coverage is more 
extensive as the responsibility for monitoring and disciplining is shifted to the DI agency. Thus as our 
                                                          
13
 Detailed variable definitions and sources are provided in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix. 
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fourth proxy, DI repayment history measures the compensation that depositors received in the past. 
Looking at prior bank failures, we consider whether insured depositors were fully compensated and 
whether uninsured depositors were compensated. In each case, a value of one is assigned such that 
the DI replacement history index can range from 0 to 2. Fifth, we consider DI coverage intensity 
based on whether there is a coverage limit, whether formal coinsurance explicitly insures depositors 
for less than 100% of their deposits and whether foreign currency deposits are excluded. In each 
case, a value of one is assigned if coverage is not limited. As such, that the DI coverage intensity 
index can range from 0 to 3. Sixth, for those DI schemes that have a coverage limit, we measure DI 
coverage limit as the natural logarithm of US dollar amount at which coverage is limited.  
DI schemes change over time even before 2008 and vary across countries as the summary 
statistics in Table A3 in the Appendix indicate. In general, countries might provide implicit DI or 
increase existing insurance in times of banking crisis or failures. In particular, during the 2008/09 
financial crisis, many countries responded by quickly taking emergency actions in 2008. All 
emergency actions enhance DI coverage. The data are taken from World Bank’s Deposit Insurance 
Database (see Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, & Laeven, 2014) and in line with the IADI’s categorization, we 
differentiate between the introduction of an explicit DI and the provisions of a government 
guarantee, regardless of the guaranteed amount. Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, & Laeven (2014) cover 20 of 
our 22 bank countries and we thus need to drop Panama and Macao from our sample of bank 
countries. Among them, 15 countries have undergone the 2008/09 financial crisis. These countries 
plus Australia introduced explicit DI on October 12th, 2008. Six countries (namely Australia, Austria, 
Denmark, Germany, Ireland and the United States) announced official guarantees on deposits, of 
which Germany and United States set a limited guarantee, while the other four countries provide an 
unlimited guarantee.  
To test the effects of crises on cross-border deposits, we employ the Systemic Banking Crises 
Database by Laeven & Valencia (2008) which identifies three types of crises, namely banking, 
currency and sovereign debt crises. A banking crisis is defined as a situation where “a country’s 
corporate and financial sectors experience a large number of defaults and financial institutions and 
corporations face great difficulties repaying contracts on time. As a result, non-performing loans 
increase sharply and all or most of the aggregate banking system capital is exhausted”. We consider 
all systemic banking crises during our sample period, that is, 1998-2007. Table A4 in the Appendix 
shows the frequency of banking crises over time and indicates that banking crises are more frequent 
in 1998-1999 which at least partly reflects the Asian crisis. During the following years, the number of 
systemic banking crises fluctuates on a relatively low level. As the Systemic Banking Crises Database 
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also includes information on the starting and ending year of the systemic banking crises that enables 
us to cover not only the start of the crises, but also the whole period of it. 
 Finally, we include a set of control variables that are specific for the bank and depositor 
country pair and vary over time. Sizeijt is based on the total GDP of both countries obtained from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database. From the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics we obtain our proxy for creditijt, e.g. the size of the banking market measured as the two 
countries’ aggregate domestic credit to the private sector as percent of GDP. We employ three 
measures of openness. First, the KOFijt Index of Globalization serves as a proxy for de jure openness. 
Second, we measure de facto openness via tradeijt which reflects the imports and exports between 
the bank and depositor country and is obtained from the STAN Database. Third, we include a dummy 
variable set to one if both countries belong to the same free trade area (FTAijt). We also control for 
exchange rate risk by coding a dummy variable equal to one if the bank and depositor country 
belong to the same currency unionijt. FTA and currency union data are obtained and updated from 
Sander, Kleimeier, & Heuchemer (2013) with the original definitions following Rose (2005) and 
Ilzetzki, Reinhart, & Rogoff (2008), respectively. Furthermore, we recognize that differences in rates 
of return on deposits as an important determinant of cross-border deposits. Our deposit rateijt proxy 
controls for the difference between foreign and domestic deposit interest rates, with higher values 
indicating higher returns when depositing abroad. Annual deposit rates are obtained from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics. We also include internetijt access. Sander, Kleimeier, & Heuchemer 
(2016) argue that in countries in which a high percentage of the population has internet access, 
banks have a strong incentive to develop internet banking portals and depositors have low bank 
transaction costs and can easily and inexpensively deposit across borders. To capture both the bank 
and depositor side, we obtain data regarding the percentage of individuals with internet access from 
the UN’s World Telecommunication/ITC Indicators dataset and measure internetijt as the product of 
the bank and depositor country. Finally, governanceijt captures differences in institutional quality 
between bank and depositor country with data based on the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators and with higher values indicating better institutional quality abroad. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Safe Haven and Regulatory Arbitrage in Cross-Border Depositing 
In this section we examine the impact of various DI designs on cross-border deposits. We assume 
that not only the design of the DI system in the bank country matters, but that also the differences 
in DI design between bank and depositor country matters. In other words, we investigate both the 
Safe Haven and Regulatory Arbitrage hypotheses. 
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We start with the Safe Haven Hypothesis by investigating the impact of the existence of an 
explicit DI in the bank country and its characteristics on cross-border deposits based on our gravity 
model of equation (1). Results are shown in Table 1. Regressions (1) to (6) provide a parsimonious 
specification in which we only control for size in addition to our various fixed effects. The 
specification of regressions (7) to (12) is more profligate with a more complete set of control 
variables. As during our sample period, explicit DI does not change over time for any given bank 
country, we can only include depositor country and year fixed effects in regressions (1) and (7). To 
compensate for the lack of country-pair fixed effects, we instead add gravity country-pair controls, 
e.g. proxies for geographical distance, common border, common language, colony and common 
legal system. In regression (1), the impact of an explicit DI is highly significant and – as expected – 
positive, indicating that bank countries with an explicit DI attract more cross-border deposits than 
bank countries without an explicit DI. Results regarding the DI agency’s power and actions taken to 
mitigate moral hazard in the DI systems affect cross-border deposits are reported in regressions (2) 
and (3) and indicate that more deposits flow to countries whose DI agency have more power or take 
more actions to mitigate moral hazard. Regarding the coverage provided by the DI scheme, 
regressions (4) to (6) indicate that countries with a higher coverage limit are more attractive to 
cross-border depositors and there is marginal evidence that depositors care about the DI’s coverage 
intensity. In contrast, repayment history does not matter. Our results are not only statistically 
significant but also economically relevant. For example, the introduction of an explicit DI is 
associated with an 80% increase in cross-border deposits. As the shift from an implicit or non-
existent to an explicit DI constitutes a fundamental change in the country’s banking system, such a 
substantial increase in cross-border deposits is not surprising. Furthermore, a one-unit increase in 
the DI power, moral hazard mitigation and coverage intensity increases cross-border deposits by 
4.1%, 6.2% and 3%, respectively. Finally, a 1% increase in the coverage limit increases cross-border 
deposits by 0.55%. This is economically meaningful considering that a one standard deviation change 
in the coverage limit can be associated with a 6.2% change in cross-border deposits. In regressions (7) 
to (12) we add more control variables but our DI results are robust with very similar coefficients and 
significance levels. In regression (10), the DI repayment history proxy is now marginally significant 
with an economic effect of 2% on cross-border deposits for a one-unit increase in the repayment 
history proxy. 14 Overall, our results are in line with our Safe Haven Hypothesis: The existence of 
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 The control variables generally show the expected coefficients indicating that cross-border deposits are 
higher when bank and depositor country are larger, are linked by trade flows, share a common currency, have 
more internet access or are more similar in terms of governance. Cross-border deposits are also higher when 
the bank country offers higher deposit rates than the depositor country. In regression (7) we find unexpected 
negative coefficients for globalization, internet and governance which might be driven by the fact that our 
gravity control variables do not fully capture all country-pair fixed effects.  
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explicit DI systems and the strength of the features of the DI schemes in terms of power, moral 
hazard mitigation and coverage attract more cross-border deposits to that country.15, 16 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
So far we only examine how the DI systems in the bank countries would impact cross-border 
deposits. However, the differences in DI schemes between any pair of a bank country and a 
depositor country may also matter in a relative way. In this sense, the DI system in the depositor 
country may serve as a benchmark. Next to the absolute quality of the DI system in the bank country, 
depositors also care how much better the DI in the bank country is relative to their home country. To 
test for the Regulatory Arbitrage Hypothesis, we take differences of all the DI measures between all 
pairs of bank countries and depositor countries and regress cross-border deposits on these 
differences in DI schemes as indicated by model (2). Results are shown in Table 2 and we can 
conclude that depositors hold more funds in bank countries with better DI schemes than they can 
find in their home country. Specifically, depositors from countries without explicit DI tend to deposit 
their money in bank countries with explicit DI while depositors from countries with explicit DI are 
less likely to deposit their money in bank countries without explicit DI. Equally relevant in terms of 
statistical significance are the results that bank countries whose DI authorities have relatively 
stronger power than the DI authorities in the depositor countries and bank countries with DI 
schemes designed to mitigate moral hazard more effectively than DI schemes in the depositor 
countries attract more cross-border deposits. In contrast, the coefficients of the coverage related DI 
features are insignificant. While results are overall in accordance with the Regulatory Arbitrage 
Hypothesis, it also becomes clear that regulatory arbitrage only occurs when the bank country’s DI 
surpasses a minimum level of trustworthiness as indicated by the role of DI power and DI moral 
hazard mitigation and regulatory arbitrage with respect to coverage is not important for depositors. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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 We conduct robustness checks to allow for the possibility that our match of annual cross-border deposit 
data to DI data from surveys in 1998, 2002 and 2006 is inaccurate. We therefore restrict our sample period to 
the three years in which the DI survey took place. Results are shown in Table A4 in the Appendix and are 
robust. Corresponding robustness checks for Tables 2, 3 and 4 can be found in Tables A6, A7 and A8 in the 
Appendix and also here results are robust. 
16
 Table A9 in the Appendix shows that the DI proxies are correlated, i.e. when differentiating between stable 
and crisis periods. The joint inclusion of all DI proxies causes multicollinearity problems, i.e. for the DI moral 
hazard proxy. We thus insert the DI proxies one-by-one into our empirical model. 
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4.2. Cross-Border Banking and Home Country Banking Crisis 
In this section we investigate whether the relationships between DI schemes and cross-border 
deposits change when bank countries experience a systemic banking crisis. Depositor country 
banking crises are modeled as indicated in equations (3) and (4) and reported in Table 3 and Table 4. 
In Table 3 we examine Safe Haven in Crisis Hypothesis. As shown in regressions (1) and (7), the 
existence of an explicit DI is important for foreign depositors both in stable times and in times of 
crisis. This indicates that when the depositor’s home country is undergoing a systemic banking crisis, 
depositors still trust the foreign DI systems. Furthermore, the power of the DI agency and the 
actions taken to mitigate DI-induced moral are found to be more important during times of crisis. 
Economically regressions (8) and (9) indicate that one unit stronger DI power and DI moral hazard 
mitigation is associated with 8.3% and 10.5% more cross-border deposits during crisis times 
compared to only 3.0% and 6.2% during stable times, respectively. When it comes to coverage 
related DI design features in bank countries during stable and crisis times, Table 3 shows several 
remarkable findings. Firstly, DI coverage limit is equally important in stable as in crisis times. 
Secondly, during a systemic banking crisis, depositors pay attention to historical record of the DI 
system as the switch from an insignificant coefficient to a significantly positive coefficient for DI 
repayment history between stable and crisis times shows. During crisis times, a one-unit increase in 
the DI repayment history index is associated with 8.3% more cross-border deposits. Thirdly, a similar 
result in coefficient size and significance can be observed for DI coverage intensity. The marginally 
significant coefficients for these two DI features reported in Table 1 are thus driven by crisis periods 
only. During a crisis, depositors thus do not only care about the absolute amount of deposits insured 
by the DI scheme but also about the historical record of the DI agency during prior bank failures as 
well as about secondary coverage aspects such as coinsurance or the coverage of foreign currency 
deposits. Unreported F-tests indicate for all DI proxies except explicit DI that the difference between 
the stable and crisis period coefficient is statistically significant. In sum, these results support our 
Safe Haven in Crisis Hypothesis and indicate that depositors value safe havens more when their 
home countries are undergoing a systemic banking crisis.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Using model (4) to test our Regulatory Arbitrage in Crisis Hypothesis, Table 4 reports the 
results during stable and crisis times for the differences in DI between bank and depositor countries. 
Table 4 reveals that depositors are willing to chase “better” explicit DI in stable and crisis times. In 
contrast, DI power and DI moral hazard mitigation only matter during stable times. This result stands 
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in contrast to the results for Safe Haven in Crisis Hypothesis in Table 3 where effects become 
stronger rather than weaker during a crisis. One possible explanation could be that depositors 
consider regulatory arbitrage during stable times, but when they are hit by a crisis, they care less 
about the arbitrage opportunities and only care whether their deposits are safe, that is, whether 
their deposits are deposited in countries with an explicit DI. Overall, Table 4 therefore suggests that 
regulatory arbitrage behavior disappears in times of crisis and depositors only move across borders 
when they are not protected by an explicit DI scheme at home.  
 The evidence provided here indicates that safe havens are becoming more important during 
crisis times while regulatory arbitrage only remains relevant for depositors from countries without 
an explicit DI. On might say, that depositors search for the best protection in time of crisis and thus 
relocate deposits to safe havens. Only during stable times are depositors willing to consider 
regulatory arbitrage.  
 
 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
4.3. The Role of Emergency Actions during Global Financial Crisis 
Our analysis so far suggests that during a banking crisis in the home country, foreign safe havens 
become important to depositors. However, during the 2008/09 financial crisis safe havens were in 
short supply as bank countries which during our early sample period from 1998 to 2007 had not 
experienced a banking crisis are now subject to a crisis as well.  As a consequence, many bank 
countries took emergency actions by implementing explicit DI schemes or enhancing government 
guarantees. To examine the impact of such emergency actions on cross-border deposits, we employ 
a difference in difference analysis as outlined in model (5) and thereby test our Emergency Actions 
Hypothesis. Results are shown in Table 5. It is important to note that we do not only rely on the full 
sample of country-pairs involving all bank countries, but also conduct the difference in difference 
analysis with a subsample containing only those country-pairs for which the bank countries have 
experienced the 2008/09 crisis. By doing this, we can further narrow down our control groups, thus 
making our results more precise, i.e. countries that have undergone the 2008/09 crisis have similar 
characteristics and this similarity is higher within this subgroup than compared to countries that 
were not exposed to the 2008/09 crisis. We start with regression (1) where we examine the impact 
of an explicit DI introduction and show that this emergency measure significantly increases cross-
border deposits. Similarly regressions (2) to (4) show that cross-border deposits increase when 
government guarantees, whether limited or unlimited, are introduced. Regressions (1) to (4) are 
based on our full sample of country-pairs based on all 20 bank countries. Regressions (5) to (7) are 
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based on the subsample of country-pairs for which the bank countries have experienced the 
2008/09 crisis but we find almost the identical results as in regressions (2) to (4), indicating that our 
control groups are unbiased. In addition, besides the full time period of 1998-2011, we also check 
the treatment effect with a narrower time window from 2006 to 2009 which captures the 4 years 
surrounding the introduction of emergency actions in 2008. Results are shown in regressions (8) to 
(14) and are robust albeit with smaller coefficients. This shorter period mitigates the time trend 
concern in the sense that the early years of the sample period (1998-2005) could be – for reasons 
unrelated to the crisis – substantially different than the more recent years and confirms our previous 
results. In sum, the emergency actions appear to be very successful in terms of providing the safe 
havens that depositors were looking for during a global financial crisis. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
5. Conclusions 
Our results indicate that the existence of an explicit DI, as well as other DI design features, 
affect cross-border depositing and thus the geography of global banking. The existence of an explicit 
DI is attractive to foreign depositors in the sense that it provides a higher level of deposit safety. But 
the design of the DI plays an important role, too. Eisenbeis & Kaufman (2015) argue that an effective 
DI system consists of a credible guarantee, effective monitoring by supervisors, and an efficient 
resolution mechanism. Our results show that the DI power, moral hazard mitigation which 
encompasses credibility and effective monitoring as well as coverage related DI features matter for 
cross-border depositing. Our findings regarding these specific DI design features further underline 
the importance of credibility as depositors identify safe havens as those banking markets with DI 
schemes that provide high coverage. We further demonstrate that the relationships between DI 
systems and cross-border deposits vary in stable times and in times of systemic banking crises in 
depositor countries. In crises times depositors have more incentives to chase a safe haven rather 
than to engage in regulatory arbitrage.  When it comes to a global finance crisis it is the emergency 
actions of bank country governments, which supply and maintain these safe havens, that matter and 
can lead substantial relocations of cross-border deposits. As such, these actions do not only rescue 
the banks and domestic depositors of the countries taking these (credible) emergency actions. They 
also have measurable and sizeable effects on other countries in a financially interdependent world, 
which may call for coordinated emergency actions that take possible spillovers across countries into 
account. However, even in tranquil times, our results show that the design of an effective DI must 
take the DI’s impact on cross-border activities of depositors into account. Our findings add therefore 
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also to the debate on the design of macro-prudential instruments in globalized financial markets.  
This discussion, currently focused on bank lending, questions their effectiveness when banks and 
borrowers are able to circumvent these measures via regulatory arbitrage and calls for coordination 
among national regulators (Houston, Lin & Ma, 2012; Ongena, Popov & Udell, 2013; Reinhardt & 
Sowerbutts, 2015). Likewise, our findings, documenting a novel pattern of save haven and regulatory 
arbitrage driven behavior by depositors, also stress the need for a coordinated regulatory strategy 
with respect to deposit insurance schemes.  
 
Appendix 
[Insert Tables A1 to A9 here] 
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Table 1. Testing the Safe Haven Hypothesis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Explicit DI 0.60*** 0.58***
(11.71) (11.50)
DI power 0.04*** 0.04***
(4.38) (4.21)
DI moral hazard mitigation 0.06*** 0.06***
(3.02) (2.90)
DI repayment history 0.01 0.02*
(0.92) (1.78)
DI coverage intensity 0.03* 0.03*
(1.75) (1.67)
DI coverage limit 0.55*** 0.55***
(12.85) (12.64)
Size 0.38*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.24*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.12***
(40.46) (3.79) (3.72) (3.67) (3.75) (4.61) (15.39) (3.44) (3.48) (3.42) (3.51) (4.42)
Credit 1.27*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01
(29.60) (-0.29) (-0.32) (-0.27) (-0.11) (-0.33)
Trade 0.17*** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.05***
(13.12) (2.12) (2.22) (2.08) (2.05) (4.96)
Globalisation -1.63*** -0.09 -0.08 -0.13 -0.12 -0.07
(-13.26) (-0.74) (-0.64) (-1.04) (-0.96) (-0.54)
FTA -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
(-0.14) (0.67) (0.66) (0.66) (0.67) (1.00)
Currency union -0.02 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.15***
(-0.21) (3.14) (2.94) (3.04) (3.00) (2.82)
Deposit rate 0.00 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*
(0.69) (2.47) (2.61) (2.67) (2.68) (1.65)
Internet -1.19*** 1.01*** 1.03*** 1.02*** 1.01*** 1.04***
(-5.72) (10.00) (10.25) (10.15) (10.04) (10.15)
Governance 0.56*** -0.09** -0.06 -0.07* -0.07* 0.07*
(14.65) (-2.32) (-1.53) (-1.86) (-1.79) (1.78)
Gravity country-pair controls Yes No No No No No Yes No No No No No
Country-pair fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank country fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Depositor country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.553 0.945 0.945 0.945 0.945 0.951 0.583 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.952
Observations 20,820 18,870 18,870 18,870 18,870 16,460 20,820 18,870 18,870 18,870 18,870 16,460
Note: This table presents the estimates from ordinary least square regressions of cross-border deposits from depositor country j to bank country i in year t. All variable definitions
can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. The coefficients are reported in the top row, t-values are reported below in brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2. Testing the Regulatory Arbitrage Hypothesis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Explicit DI 0.44*** 0.38***
(10.09) (8.84)
DI power 0.03*** 0.03***
(3.20) (3.37)
DI moral hazard mitigation 0.08*** 0.05***
(4.22) (2.76)
DI repayment history -0.01 -0.01
(-0.81) (-1.01)
DI coverage intensity 0.00 0.00
(0.07) (0.26)
DI coverage limit 0.01 0.01
(0.81) (0.98)
Size 0.40*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.24***
(42.71) (4.92) (5.54) (5.12) (5.15) (5.26) (16.65) (4.05) (4.66) (4.40) (4.39) (4.66)
Credit 1.26*** 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(29.21) (0.80) (0.91) (1.06) (1.08) (0.85)
Trade 0.17*** 0.02* 0.02* 0.02 0.02 0.03*
(12.93) (1.73) (1.65) (1.62) (1.59) (1.71)
Globalisation -1.53*** -0.64*** -0.63*** -0.68*** -0.67*** -0.85***
(-12.52) (-3.29) (-3.19) (-3.46) (-3.42) (-3.67)
FTA -0.00 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03
(-0.03) (1.15) (1.21) (1.10) (1.13) (0.73)
Currency union -0.01 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.12*
(-0.16) (2.83) (2.73) (2.82) (2.82) (1.92)
Deposit rate 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00
(0.36) (1.63) (1.72) (1.68) (1.74) (1.49)
Internet -1.20*** 0.68*** 0.66*** 0.67*** 0.67*** 0.94***
(-5.72) (5.03) (4.84) (4.94) (4.93) (5.79)
Governance 0.55*** -0.20*** -0.15** -0.16*** -0.17*** -0.08
(14.43) (-3.25) (-2.43) (-2.73) (-2.80) (-1.23)
Gravity country-pair controls Yes No No No No No Yes No No No No No
Country-pair fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank country fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Depositor country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.553 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.949 0.582 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.950
Observations 20,820 10,763 10,763 10,763 10,763 7,694 20,820 10,763 10,763 10,763 10,763 7,694
Note: This table presents the estimates from ordinary least square regressions of cross-border deposits from depositor country j to bank country i in year t. All variable definitions
can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. The coefficients are reported in the top row, t-values are reported below in brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3. Testing the Safe Haven in Crisis Hypothesis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Explicit DI * Stable 0.59*** 0.59***
(11.50) (11.59)
Explicit DI * Crisis 0.73*** 0.48***
(8.41) (5.68)
DI power * Stable 0.04*** 0.03***
(4.13) (3.96)
DI power * Crisis 0.07*** 0.08***
(3.69) (3.76)
DI moral hazard mitigation * Stable 0.06*** 0.06***
(2.96) (2.82)
DI moral hazard mitigation * Crisis 0.09*** 0.10***
(3.35) (3.49)
DI repayment history * Stable 0.01 0.02
(0.72) (1.58)
DI repayment history * Crisis 0.06** 0.08***
(2.44) (3.07)
DI coverage intensity * Stable 0.03 0.03
(1.61) (1.49)
DI coverage intensity * Crisis 0.07*** 0.08***
(3.21) (3.36)
DI coverage limit * Stable 0.54*** 0.55***
(12.83) (12.61)
DI coverage limit * Crisis 0.55*** 0.55***
(12.99) (12.78)
Size 0.39*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.24*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.13***
(40.48) (3.94) (3.80) (3.76) (3.96) (4.81) (15.37) (3.59) (3.59) (3.52) (3.73) (4.61)
Credit 1.28*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02
(29.62) (-0.49) (-0.60) (-0.63) (-0.55) (-0.74)
Trade 0.17*** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.05***
(13.15) (2.09) (2.19) (2.07) (2.04) (4.93)
Globalisation -1.64*** -0.10 -0.09 -0.14 -0.13 -0.08
(-13.31) (-0.78) (-0.68) (-1.07) (-1.01) (-0.61)
FTA -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
(-0.13) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.97)
Currency union -0.01 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.15***
(-0.19) (3.09) (2.87) (2.94) (2.89) (2.70)
Deposit rate 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*
(0.56) (2.59) (2.74) (2.81) (2.87) (1.85)
Internet -1.20*** 1.01*** 1.04*** 1.03*** 1.03*** 1.05***
(-5.77) (10.05) (10.35) (10.26) (10.21) (10.29)
Governance 0.56*** -0.09** -0.06 -0.07* -0.07* 0.06*
(14.67) (-2.43) (-1.62) (-1.96) (-1.95) (1.65)
Gravity country-pair controls Yes No No No No No Yes No No No No No
Country-pair fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank country fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Depositor country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.553 0.945 0.945 0.945 0.945 0.951 0.583 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.952
Observations 20,820 18,870 18,870 18,870 18,870 16,460 20,820 18,870 18,870 18,870 18,870 16,460
Note: This table presents the estimates from ordinary least square regressions of  cross-border deposits from depositor country j to bank country i  in year t. All variable definitions can be 
found in Table A1 in the Appendix. The coefficients are reported in the top row, t-values are reported below in brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively.
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Table 4. Testing the Regulatory Arbitrage in Crisis Hypothesis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Explicit DI * Stable 0.43*** 0.37***
(9.62) (8.49)
Explicit DI * Crisis 0.52*** 0.43***
(4.90) (4.11)
DI power * Stable 0.03*** 0.03***
(3.32) (3.46)
DI power * Crisis 0.01 0.01
(0.37) (0.59)
DI moral hazard mitigation * Stable 0.08*** 0.05***
(4.21) (2.74)
DI moral hazard mitigation * Crisis 0.08** 0.06
(2.02) (1.54)
DI repayment history * Stable -0.01 -0.01
(-0.60) (-0.77)
DI repayment history * Crisis -0.05 -0.06
(-1.34) (-1.56)
DI coverage intensity * Stable -0.00 0.00
(-0.09) (0.11)
DI coverage intensity * Crisis 0.05 0.06
(1.51) (1.59)
DI coverage limit * Stable 0.01 0.01
(0.81) (0.98)
DI coverage limit * Crisis 0.02 0.02
(0.45) (0.57)
Size 0.40*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.24***
(42.71) (5.00) (5.53) (5.19) (5.12) (5.23) (16.65) (4.12) (4.66) (4.49) (4.38) (4.63)
Credit 1.25*** 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
(29.20) (0.83) (0.84) (1.03) (1.11) (0.85)
Trade 0.17*** 0.02* 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03*
(12.91) (1.71) (1.63) (1.62) (1.59) (1.70)
Globalisation -1.53*** -0.65*** -0.63*** -0.68*** -0.66*** -0.85***
(-12.52) (-3.33) (-3.20) (-3.47) (-3.37) (-3.68)
FTA -0.00 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03
(-0.02) (1.15) (1.20) (1.08) (1.13) (0.75)
Currency union -0.01 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.12*
(-0.16) (2.84) (2.71) (2.83) (2.80) (1.91)
Deposit rate 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00
(0.37) (1.64) (1.71) (1.66) (1.65) (1.49)
Internet -1.20*** 0.67*** 0.66*** 0.68*** 0.67*** 0.94***
(-5.74) (4.95) (4.85) (4.99) (4.97) (5.79)
Governance 0.55*** -0.20*** -0.15** -0.16*** -0.17*** -0.08
(14.44) (-3.23) (-2.44) (-2.69) (-2.77) (-1.24)
Gravity country-pair controls Yes No No No No No Yes No No No No No
Country-pair fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank country fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Depositor country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.553 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.949 0.582 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.950
Observations 20,820 10,763 10,763 10,763 10,763 7,694 20,820 10,763 10,763 10,763 10,763 7,694
Note: This table presents the estimates from ordinary least square regressions of cross-border deposits from depositor country j to bank country i in year t. All variable definitions can be
found in Table A1 in the Appendix. The coefficients are reported in the top row, t-values are reported below in brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Explicit DI Introduction 0.65*** 0.20***
* 2008/09 Crisis Period (7.55) (2.58)
Official government guarantee 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.10*** 0.09***
* 2008/09 Crisis Period (8.96) (8.29) (3.27) (2.87)
Limited government guarantee 0.24*** 0.27*** 0.09** 0.10**
* 2008/09 Crisis Period (7.09) (7.92) (2.30) (2.57)
Unlimited government guarantee 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.11*** 0.09**
* 2008/09 Crisis Period (7.09) (5.41) (2.87) (2.18)
Size 0.02 0.05** 0.03 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.16*** 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.13** 0.18*** 0.15** 0.24***
(0.98) (2.20) (1.35) (4.25) (3.31) (2.73) (6.15) (0.92) (1.37) (0.90) (2.07) (2.59) (2.20) (3.51)
Gravity country-pair controls No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Country-pair fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Depositor country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.925 0.925 0.933 0.928 0.929 0.934 0.934 0.951 0.951 0.960 0.953 0.956 0.963 0.959
Observations 25,218 25,218 20,388 22,552 21,378 17,573 18,712 9,223 9,223 7,585 8,272 7,588 6,323 6,637
Note: This table presents the estimates from difference in difference regressions of cross-border deposits from depositor country j to bank country i in year t. Regressions (1)-
(4) and (8)-(11) are based on a full sample of country-pairs including all 20 bank countries, while regressions (5)-(7) and (12)-(14) are based on a subsample of country-pairs
including only those bank countries that have experienced the 2008/9 crisis. All variable definitions can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. The coefficients are in the first
row, the t-values are below in brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
All bank countries Bank countries in crisis
Sample period 2006-2009
Table 5. Testing the Emergency Actions Hypothesis 
All bank countries Bank countries in crisis
Sample period 1998-2011
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Variable Definition Unit Source
Dependent variable
Cross-border deposits Bank liabilities vis-à-vis non-bank sector (deposits) from depositor country to bank 
country, ln of amounts outstanding adjusted for exchange rate changes
US$mln BIS: Locational Banking Statistics; confidential 
dataset
Independent variables
Deposit insurance variables
Explicit DI Dummy equal to 1 if a country an explicit deposit insurance exists 1/0
DI power Index to measure the power of the deposit insurance authority, higher values indicate 
more power
0-4
DI moral hazard 
mitigation
Index to measure the degree to which actions are taken to mitigate moral hazard, higher 
values indicate greater mitigation of moral hazard
0-2
DI repayment history Index to measure the repayment history last time there was a bank run, higher values 
indicate better repayment history
0-2
DI coverage intensity Index to measure the coverage intensity, higher values indicate better coverage for 
depositors
0-3
DI coverage limit ln of the coverage limit in US dollar US$
Emergency actions
Explicit DI introduction Dummy equal to 1 if a country introduced an explicit deposit insurance since 2008 1/0
Official government 
guarantee
Dummy equal to 1 if a country's government provides an official guarantee since 2008 1/0
Limited government 
guarantee
Dummy equal to 1 if a country's government provides a limited guarantee since 2008 1/0
Unlimited government 
guarantee
Dummy equal to 1 if a country's government provides an unlimited guarantee since 2008 1/0
Time dummies
Stable Dummy equal to 1 if a depositor country does not experience a systemic banking crisis in 
year t
1/0
Crisis Dummy equal to 1 if a depositor country experiences a systemic banking crisis in year t 1/0
2008/09 Crisis Period Dummy equal to 1 for years 2008 to 2011 Authors' calculations
Country-pair control variables
Size Size of the two countries based on GDP, measured as the sum of the ln amounts for bank 
and depositor country
US$mln World Bank: World Development Indicators 
Database
Credit Domestic credit to the private sector as percent of GDP, measured as the product of bank 
and depositor country
0-1
IMF: International Financial Statistics
(continued)
Table A1. Variable definitions and sources
IMF: Systemic Banking Crises Database (Laeven 
and Valencia, 2008, 2010, 2012)
World Bank: Deposit Insurance Database 
(Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2014); available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/XU2OVOGZJ0
World Bank: Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Surveys; available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/SNUSW978P0
29 
 
Variable Definition Unit Source
Trade Bilateral trade between bank and depositor country, measured as the ln of the sum of 
export and imports
US$mln
OECD: STAN Bilateral Trade Database
Globalization Overall globalization with higher value indicating more globalisation, measured as the sum 
of the ln amounts for bank and depositor country
0-100
KOF Index of Globalization
FTA Dummy equal to 1 if bank and depositor country belong to the same free trade area 1/0 Data provided on Andrew Rose's website at 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose
Currency union Dummy equal to 1 if bank and depositor country belong to the same currency union 1/0 Ilzetzki et al. (2008); data available at 
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/ilzetzki/IRRBack.htm
Deposit rate Depository interest rate difference, measured as the difference between bank and 
depositor country
%
IMF: International Financial Statistics
Internet Percentage of population that has internet connection, measured as the product of bank 
and depositor country
0-1 UN: World Telecommunication/ITC Indicators 
Data; available at 
http://data.un.org/Explorer.aspx
Governance Governance quality is measured as the average across the six individual governance 
indicators forVoice and Accountability, Political Stability & Absence of Violence, 
Government Effectiveness,Regulatory Quality,Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption; 
higher values indicate better governance, measured as the difference between bank and 
depositor country
-2.5-2.5
World Bank: Worldwide Governance Indicators; 
available at www.govindicators.org
Gravity country-pair control variables
Distance Great circle distance between capital cities km Great Circle Distances Between Capital Cities, at 
http://www.chemical-
ecology.net/java/capitals.htm 
Common border Dummy equal to 1 if bank and depositor country share a land border 1/0
Common language Dummy equal to 1 if bank and depositor country share a common language 1/0
Common colony Dummy equal to 1 if bank country ever colonized depositor country or vice versa (colony 
after 1945)
1/0
Common legal system Dummy equal to 1 if bank and depositor country share the same legal system 1/0
Note: All deposit insurance proxies are originally measured on a country- and year-level. For the Safe Haven analyses, the proxy for the bank country is used, e.g. Proxy i t. For the 
Regulatory Arbitrage analyses, the difference between the bank and depositor country is used, e.g. Proxy i jt = Proxyi t - Proxyjt.
Data provided on Andrew Rose's website at 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu /arose (Rose's 
original source is CIA World Factbook)
Table A1 continued. Variable definitions and sources
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Variable Questions Index
(1) Does the deposit insurance authority make the decision to 
intervene in a bank?
(2) Does the deposit insurance authority have the legal power to cancel 
or revoke deposit insurance for any participating bank? 
(3) Can the deposit insurance authority take legal action for violations 
against laws, regulations, and bylaws against bank officials?
(4) Has the deposit insurance authority ever taken legal action for 
violations against laws, regulations, and bylaws against bank officials?
(1) Is the deposit insurance funded by banks?
(2) Do deposit insurance fees charged to banks vary based on some 
assessment of risk? 
(1) Were insured depositors wholly compensated (to the extent of legal 
protection) the last time a bank failed?
(2) Were any deposits not explicitly covered by deposit insurance at the 
time of the failure compensated when the bank failed?
(1) Is there a no limit per person?
(2) Is there no formal coinsurance?
(3) Does the deposit insurance scheme include coverage of foreign 
currency deposits? 
Note: If a question is answered with yes, a value of 1 is assigned. If a question is answered with no, a
value of 0 is assigned. The index for each deposit insurance characteristic equals the sum of the values to
all relevant questions.
Table A2. Deposit insurance indices
DI coverage 
intensity
(1)+(2)+(3)
(1)+(2)+(3)+(4)DI power
(1)+(2)
DI moral hazard 
mitigation
DI repayment 
history
(1)+(2)
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cross-border deposits 20,820 2.89 2.74 0 13.13
Bank country
Explicit DI 20,820 0.91 0.29 0 1
DI power 18,870 1.10 0.95 0 4
DI moral hazard mitigation 18,870 1.28 0.55 0 2
DI repayment history 18,870 0.99 0.63 0 2
DI coverage intensity 18,870 1.61 0.86 0 3
DI coverage limit 16,460 10.04 0.95 7.60 11.77
Country-pair differences
Explicit DI 20,820 0.33 0.58 -1 1
DI power 10,763 0.02 1.51 -4 4
DI moral hazard mitigation 10,763 0.29 0.91 -2 2
DI repayment history 10,763 0.10 0.97 -2 2
DI coverage intensity 10,763 0.10 1.13 -3 3
DI coverage limit 7,694 0.36 1.97 -9.79 6.44
Size 20,820 23.53 2.78 14.12 35.37
Credit 20,820 0.57 0.55 0.00 5.95
Trade 20,820 5.19 2.88 0.00 13.25
Globalisation 20,820 8.49 0.41 5.06 9.07
FTA 20,820 0.07 0.26 0 1
Currency union 20,820 0.05 0.22 0 1
Deposit rate 20,820 -3.80 10.74 -202.63 27.73
Internet 20,820 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.71
Governance 20,820 1.04 1.09 -2.21 3.50
Explicit DI Introduction 25,218 0.04 0.20 0 1
Official government guarantee 25,218 0.30 0.46 0 1
Limited government guarantee 25,218 0.11 0.31 0 1
Unlimited government guarantee 25,218 0.19 0.39 0 1
Table A3. Summary statistics
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Table A4. Systemic banking crises
Year
Number of countries in 
crisis
1998 16
1999 11
2000 9
2001 7
2002 3
2003 3
2004 2
2005 1
2006 0
2007 2
2008 22
2009 23
2010 23
2011 23
Note: Borderline systemic banking 
crises are included. 
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Table A5. Robustness checks regarding the testing of the Safe Haven Hypothesis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Explicit DI 0.55*** 0.53***
(5.94) (5.77)
DI power 0.06*** 0.06***
(3.27) (3.44)
DI moral hazard mitigation 0.10** 0.10**
(2.43) (2.45)
DI repayment history 0.04* 0.06**
(1.65) (2.15)
DI coverage intensity 0.02 0.01
(0.45) (0.23)
DI coverage limit 0.62*** 0.64***
(6.53) (6.64)
Size 0.38*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.26*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.21***
(22.00) (2.89) (2.79) (2.78) (2.77) (3.22) (9.36) (3.23) (3.17) (3.18) (3.12) (3.59)
Credit 1.23*** -0.10** -0.10** -0.10** -0.09** -0.08*
(16.05) (-2.14) (-2.08) (-2.08) (-1.98) (-1.70)
Trade 0.16*** 0.03 0.03* 0.03 0.03 0.06***
(6.83) (1.61) (1.75) (1.55) (1.58) (3.34)
Globalisation -1.82*** 0.19 0.19 0.08 0.12 0.15
(-8.24) (0.77) (0.77) (0.32) (0.48) (0.60)
FTA -0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07
(-0.57) (0.49) (0.44) (0.48) (0.46) (1.18)
Currency union -0.01 0.37*** 0.34*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.36***
(-0.09) (4.09) (3.79) (3.95) (3.92) (4.12)
Deposit rate -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.06) (0.97) (1.13) (1.15) (1.20) (0.76)
Internet -1.49*** 1.15*** 1.17*** 1.16*** 1.14*** 1.17***
(-4.21) (5.86) (5.94) (5.87) (5.77) (5.84)
Governance 0.64*** -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.12*
(9.27) (-0.09) (0.48) (0.20) (0.24) (1.68)
Gravity country-pair controls Yes No No No No No Yes No No No No No
Country-pair fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank country fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Depositor country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.547 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.932 0.577 0.925 0.925 0.925 0.925 0.934
Observations 6,246 5,661 5,661 5,661 5,661 4,964 6,246 5,661 5,661 5,661 5,661 4,964
Note: This table presents the estimates from ordinary least square regressions of cross-border deposits from depositor country j to bank country i in year t. The sample period is
restricted to the years 1998, 2002 and 2006. All variable definitions can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. The coefficients are reported in the top row, t-values are reported
below in brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table A6.Robustness checks regarding the testing of the Regulatory Arbitrage Hypothesis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Explicit DI 0.41*** 0.33***
(5.25) (4.29)
DI power 0.04** 0.04**
(2.17) (2.28)
DI moral hazard mitigation 0.11*** 0.08**
(3.06) (2.29)
DI repayment history 0.03 0.03
(1.44) (1.08)
DI coverage intensity -0.01 -0.00
(-0.31) (-0.15)
DI coverage limit 0.01 0.01
(0.52) (0.47)
Size 0.39*** 0.25*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.40*** 0.28*** 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.42***
(23.15) (3.00) (3.48) (3.29) (3.22) (3.79) (10.05) (3.30) (3.64) (3.48) (3.48) (3.55)
Credit 1.21*** -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
(15.78) (-1.29) (-1.19) (-1.12) (-1.14) (-0.91)
Trade 0.15*** 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03
(6.75) (1.30) (1.30) (1.08) (1.13) (1.34)
Globalisation -1.72*** -0.22 -0.19 -0.26 -0.28 -0.62
(-7.84) (-0.58) (-0.52) (-0.70) (-0.76) (-1.32)
FTA -0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.11
(-0.46) (0.65) (0.72) (0.78) (0.73) (1.14)
Currency union -0.02 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.39*** 0.36***
(-0.12) (3.93) (3.86) (3.95) (3.97) (3.46)
Deposit rate -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.30) (-0.03) (0.50) (0.48) (0.38) (1.02)
Internet -1.46*** 0.90*** 0.86*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 1.20***
(-4.10) (3.40) (3.23) (3.33) (3.32) (3.70)
Governance 0.63*** -0.09 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 0.04
(9.14) (-0.74) (-0.20) (-0.53) (-0.51) (0.29)
Gravity country-pair controls Yes No No No No No Yes No No No No No
Country-pair fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank country fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Depositor country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.546 0.925 0.926 0.925 0.925 0.927 0.576 0.927 0.927 0.927 0.927 0.929
Observations 6,246 3,259 3,259 3,259 3,259 2,387 6,246 3,259 3,259 3,259 3,259 2,387
Note: This table presents the estimates from ordinary least square regressions of cross-border deposits from depositor country j to bank country i in year t. The sample period is
restricted to the years 1998, 2002 and 2006. All variable definitions can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. The coefficients are reported in the top row, t-values are reported
below in brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table A7. Robustness checks regarding the testing of the Safe Haven in Crisis Hypothesis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Explicit DI * Stable 0.54*** 0.54***
(5.74) (5.83)
Explicit DI * Crisis 0.77*** 0.42***
(4.88) (2.70)
DI power * Stable 0.06*** 0.06***
(3.13) (3.26)
DI power * Crisis 0.09** 0.10**
(2.11) (2.44)
DI moral hazard mitigation * Stable 0.10** 0.10**
(2.37) (2.38)
DI moral hazard mitigation * Crisis 0.15*** 0.17***
(2.65) (3.05)
DI repayment history * Stable 0.04 0.05*
(1.49) (1.96)
DI repayment history * Crisis 0.11** 0.14***
(2.05) (2.66)
DI coverage intensity * Stable 0.01 -0.00
(0.27) (-0.03)
DI coverage intensity * Crisis 0.09* 0.10**
(1.93) (2.14)
DI coverage limit * Stable 0.62*** 0.64***
(6.50) (6.58)
DI coverage limit * Crisis 0.63*** 0.65***
(6.62) (6.73)
Size 0.38*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.26*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.22***
(22.03) (2.97) (2.90) (2.88) (3.05) (3.44) (9.32) (3.33) (3.34) (3.33) (3.48) (3.86)
Credit 1.24*** -0.10** -0.11** -0.11** -0.12** -0.10**
(16.04) (-2.27) (-2.42) (-2.41) (-2.51) (-2.14)
Trade 0.16*** 0.03 0.03* 0.03 0.03 0.06***
(6.87) (1.58) (1.69) (1.52) (1.54) (3.27)
Globalisation -1.83*** 0.19 0.19 0.08 0.11 0.14
(-8.28) (0.76) (0.76) (0.33) (0.47) (0.58)
FTA -0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07
(-0.57) (0.46) (0.41) (0.45) (0.42) (1.13)
Currency union -0.01 0.36*** 0.33*** 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.35***
(-0.06) (4.05) (3.66) (3.82) (3.74) (3.93)
Deposit rate -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.16) (1.05) (1.25) (1.25) (1.39) (0.94)
Internet -1.52*** 1.17*** 1.22*** 1.20*** 1.21*** 1.24***
(-4.28) (5.92) (6.14) (6.04) (6.11) (6.11)
Governance 0.64*** -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.11
(9.29) (-0.13) (0.43) (0.16) (0.14) (1.60)
Gravity country-pair controls Yes No No No No No Yes No No No No No
Country-pair fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank country fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Depositor country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.547 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.932 0.577 0.925 0.925 0.925 0.925 0.934
Observations 6,246 5,661 5,661 5,661 5,661 4,964 6,246 5,661 5,661 5,661 5,661 4,964
Note: This table presents the estimates from ordinary least square regressions of cross-border deposits from depositor country j to bank country i in year t. The sample period is
restricted to the years 1998, 2002 and 2006. All variable definitions can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. The coefficients are reported in the top row, t-values are reported below in
brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table A8. Robustness checks regarding the testing of the Regulatory Arbitrage in Crisis Hypothesis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Explicit DI * Stable 0.40*** 0.32***
(4.89) (4.05)
Explicit DI * Crisis 0.56*** 0.41**
(3.11) (2.32)
DI power * Stable 0.04** 0.05**
(2.44) (2.54)
DI power * Crisis -0.03 -0.03
(-0.62) (-0.67)
DI moral hazard mitigation * Stable 0.11*** 0.08**
(3.05) (2.27)
DI moral hazard mitigation * Crisis 0.18* 0.16*
(1.92) (1.72)
DI repayment history * Stable 0.04* 0.03
(1.68) (1.40)
DI repayment history * Crisis -0.08 -0.12
(-0.92) (-1.41)
DI coverage intensity * Stable -0.01 -0.01
(-0.45) (-0.29)
DI coverage intensity * Crisis 0.07 0.08
(0.85) (0.98)
DI coverage limit * Stable 0.01 0.01
(0.50) (0.48)
DI coverage limit * Crisis 0.08 0.10
(0.83) (1.03)
Size 0.39*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.39*** 0.28*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.32*** 0.41***
(23.17) (3.22) (3.47) (3.46) (3.22) (3.70) (10.06) (3.51) (3.67) (3.69) (3.46) (3.47)
Credit 1.21*** -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
(15.75) (-1.28) (-1.36) (-1.15) (-1.09) (-0.96)
Trade 0.15*** 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03
(6.74) (1.28) (1.24) (1.08) (1.12) (1.31)
Globalisation -1.72*** -0.27 -0.21 -0.28 -0.27 -0.61
(-7.85) (-0.73) (-0.57) (-0.76) (-0.73) (-1.31)
FTA -0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.11
(-0.46) (0.62) (0.74) (0.77) (0.74) (1.15)
Currency union -0.02 0.39*** 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.35***
(-0.12) (3.99) (3.77) (3.99) (3.96) (3.38)
Deposit rate -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.29) (0.09) (0.46) (0.61) (0.36) (1.00)
Internet -1.47*** 0.87*** 0.89*** 0.90*** 0.88*** 1.24***
(-4.13) (3.30) (3.32) (3.40) (3.34) (3.78)
Governance 0.63*** -0.09 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 0.04
(9.15) (-0.72) (-0.23) (-0.51) (-0.55) (0.27)
Gravity country-pair controls Yes No No No No No Yes No No No No No
Country-pair fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank country fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Depositor country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.546 0.926 0.926 0.925 0.925 0.927 0.576 0.927 0.927 0.927 0.927 0.929
Observations 6,246 3,259 3,259 3,259 3,259 2,387 6,246 3,259 3,259 3,259 3,259 2,387
Note: This table presents the estimates from ordinary least square regressions of cross-border deposits from depositor country j to bank country i in year t. The sample period is
restricted to the years 1998, 2002 and 2006. All variable definitions can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. The coefficients are reported in the top row, t-values are reported below in
brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table A9. Correlations
Cross-
border 
deposits
DI       
power
DI moral 
hazard 
mitigation
DI 
repayment 
history
DI   
coverage 
intensity
DI   
coverage 
limit
Panel A: Correlation in the sample of Table 1 when testing the Safe Haven Hypothesis
Cross-border deposits 1.000
DI power 0.116 1.000
DI moral hazard mitigation 0.043 0.213 1.000
DI repayment history 0.114 0.083 0.362 1.000
DI coverage intensity 0.015 0.114 -0.270 -0.311 1.000
DI coverage limit 0.093 0.098 0.540 0.233 -0.021 1.000
Panel B: Correlation in the sample of Table 2 when testing the Regulatory Arbitrage Hypothesis
Cross-border deposits 1.000
DI power 0.002 1.000
DI moral hazard mitigation -0.130 0.118 1.000
DI repayment history 0.060 0.003 0.239 1.000
DI coverage intensity -0.009 0.119 -0.133 -0.092 1.000
DI coverage limit -0.123 0.039 0.371 0.160 0.009 1.000
(continued)
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Table A9 continued. Correlations
Cross-
border 
deposits
DI power 
* Stable
DI power 
* Crisis
DI moral 
hazard 
mitigation 
* Stable
DI moral 
hazard 
mitigation 
* Crisis
DI 
repayment 
history * 
Stable
DI 
repayment 
history * 
Crisis
DI 
coverage 
intensity * 
Stable
DI 
coverage 
intensity * 
Crisis
DI 
coverage 
limit * 
Stable
DI 
coverage 
limit * 
Crisis
Panel C: Correlation in the sample of Table 3 when testing the Safe Haven in Crisis Hypothesis
Cross-border deposits 1.000
DI power * Stable 0.106 1.000
DI power * Crisis 0.030 -0.162 1.000
DI moral hazard mitigation * Stable 0.032 0.299 -0.297 1.000
DI moral hazard mitigation * Crisis 0.013 -0.224 0.648 -0.411 1.000
DI repayment history * Stable 0.101 0.153 -0.209 0.450 -0.289 1.000
DI repayment history * Crisis 0.026 -0.210 0.613 -0.386 0.853 -0.271 1.000
DI coverage intensity * Stable 0.005 0.192 -0.248 -0.060 -0.343 -0.163 -0.322 1.000
DI coverage intensity * Crisis 0.021 -0.212 0.632 -0.389 0.760 -0.273 0.712 -0.324 1.000
DI coverage limit * Stable 0.040 0.305 -0.674 0.594 -0.836 0.395 -0.787 0.337 -0.800 1.000
DI coverage limit * Crisis 0.000 -0.288 0.734 -0.430 0.936 -0.333 0.871 -0.378 0.876 -0.907 1.000
Panel D: Correlation in the sample of Table 2 when testing the Regulatory Arbitrage in Crisis Hypothesis
Cross-border deposits 1.000
DI power * Stable 0.004 1.000
DI power * Crisis -0.005 0.000 1.000
DI moral hazard mitigation * Stable -0.135 0.130 0.001 1.000
DI moral hazard mitigation * Crisis 0.009 -0.001 -0.074 -0.027 1.000
DI repayment history * Stable 0.056 -0.002 0.000 0.241 -0.009 1.000
DI repayment history * Crisis 0.026 0.000 0.079 -0.007 0.243 -0.002 1.000
DI coverage intensity * Stable -0.011 0.119 0.000 -0.133 -0.009 -0.094 -0.002 1.000
DI coverage intensity * Crisis 0.006 0.001 0.124 0.015 -0.131 0.005 -0.050 0.005 1.000
DI coverage limit * Stable -0.118 0.036 -0.007 0.374 0.003 0.160 -0.002 0.011 0.003 1.000
DI coverage limit * Crisis -0.051 -0.001 0.328 -0.008 0.256 -0.004 0.247 -0.003 -0.155 -0.005 1.000
39 
 
 
Figure 1. Cross-border deposits over time
Note: This figure shows the total amount of cross-border deposits (CBD) between all 22 bank countries and all 131
depositor countries in our sample. Black bars represent unadjusted volumes of CBD, grey bars represent CBD volumes 
that are adjusted for exchange rate movements.
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Figure 2. Cross-border deposit volumes for different bank countries
Note: This figure shows the average annual volume of cross-border deposits (CBD) that each of the 22 bank countries
in our sample receives from all 131 depositor countries. Black bars represent unadjusted volumes of CBD, grey bars
represent CBD volumes that are adjusted for exchange rate movements.
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